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NOTE

KOONTZ V. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER
MANAGEMENT DISTRICT:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MONETARY
EXACTIONS IN LAND USE PLANNING
John M. Newman*

I. INTRODUCTION
Planning, whether for the sake of economics, warfare, land use, or
other purposes, seeks to set the best possible course for achieving a future
outcome. We establish and execute plans of varying complexity and longevity on a daily basis, as do other species that intend to survive the inherent variables of life. Indeed, a desire for predictability—and the safety inherent in knowing what is coming next—is ingrained in the human psyche.
We generally recognize that planning the appearance and spatiality of
the built environment, and providing for its harmonious interaction with the
natural environment, is an important contributor to societal health, safety,
and welfare. This notion became clear in the United States at the beginning
of the twentieth century as industrial growth threatened health, swelling immigrant populations were perceived as a threat to safety, and the welfare of
many appeared darkened by the shadow of looming cities.1 While the stimuli for land use planning have evolved since the advent of zoning in the
* Law Clerk, United States District Court for the District of Montana. I wish to thank Professor
Michelle Bryan for her assistance and thoughts, her intellectual challenges, and her unparalleled instruction. Thanks also to the editors and staff of the Montana Law Review for shaping this article into its final
form, and to my colleagues in Geography and Land Use Planning for many years of constructive debate
on community development and placemaking. Finally, I wish to thank my children for reminding me to
rest, and my wife, Jaymi, for making this, and everything else in life, happen.
1. Barry Cullingworth & Roger W. Caves, Planning in the USA: Policies, Issues and Processes
46–47 (2d ed., Routledge 2003).
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1920s,2 the underlying goals of protection and preservation remain solvent
in the land use planning field to this day.
Yet, planning necessarily entails restriction—in some cases, a restriction so severe it operates to usurp property rights altogether. Planning lays
bare one of the great tensions at the core of our own charter document—the
United States government exists in part to “promote the general welfare” of
its people,3 yet the government is itself restricted in the manners in which it
may go about that promotion.4
One absolutely fundamental limitation on government action, regardless of its aim, lies in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment: the
federal government is prohibited from appropriating private property for
public use without justly compensating its owner.5 By virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, this same prohibition applies to state and local governments.6
Over time, the prohibition against taking private property has increased in complexity as the federal and state governments’ use of innovative approaches to land use regulation have grown more numerous. In the
current age of the highly developed administrative state, one particularly
frequent occurrence of a government taking arises when a government regulation, by its operation, in effect takes private property.7 A subset of socalled “regulatory takings” applies to “exactions,” which occur when a governmental unit imposes some sort of condition before granting a landowner’s request to develop her property, and the condition requires the
landowner to give up some form of property.8 These exactions are subject
to heightened scrutiny because they present particularly fertile ground for
government extortion.9
Exactions analysis, contoured in the United States Supreme Court’s
decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission10 and Dolan v. City
of Tigard,11 has generally applied when a governmental unit requires the
aggrieved landowner to dedicate an interest in real property, such as a publicly dedicated trail across the developed property.12 More recently, the
2. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3. U.S. Const. preamble.
4. E.g. id. at amends. I, IV, V, VII, VIII.
5. Id. at amend. V.
6. Id. at amend. XIV.
7. Robert Meltz, Dwight H. Merriam & Richard M. Frank, The Takings Issue: Constitutional
Limits on Land Use Control and Environmental Regulation 130 (Island Press 1999).
8. Id. at 142–143.
9. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594–2595 (2013).
10. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
11. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
12. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836–837 (noting the “essential nexus” between a development condition/
exaction and the impact that the imposition purports to address requires that a “permit condition [serve]
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Court modified this understanding in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District13 to include a monetary exaction, i.e. one where the landowner is required to pay a sum of money in lieu of dedicating an interest in
real property, within the scope of heightened scrutiny outlined in Nollan
and Dolan.
The overarching purpose of this paper is to examine the Koontz decision in its factual and legal context, explore possible theories for employing
the doctrinal shift it created, and analyze one type of classic monetary exaction—cash in lieu of parkland dedication—under Nollan and Dolan, as extended by Koontz. Part II of the paper reviews the factual and procedural
history of the case, along with the national split in legal authority that precipitated the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari. Part III describes two of
the Court’s pre-Koontz rulings that, while not expressly abrogated by the
Koontz Court, certainly appear at odds with the majority opinion. Part IV
reviews the majority and dissenting opinions in detail. Part V explores the
likely impacts of the Koontz decision on some typical types of monetary
exactions used in land use decisions, and suggests some practical limitations that should apply to the holding. Part VI examines a sampling of state
statutory provisions that authorize monetary exactions in lieu of parkland
dedications, and identifies strengths and weaknesses in those provisions in
light of Koontz. Part VII concludes that, overall, while the Koontz decision
may not invalidate state land use statutes or reverse local government decisions on any particularly large scale, the foothold it provides aggrieved developers and landowners may put a strain on local government resources
due to increased legal challenges, and may negatively affect local governments’ abilities to mitigate the effects of new development where challenges to monetary exaction programs prove successful. This paper suggests the strain is likely undue and unnecessary, there are ways to view and
apply Koontz to avoid it, and there are ways states can amend cash-in-lieu
statutes to minimize the effect of the holding.
II. CONTEXT

OF THE

KOONTZ DECISION

A. Factual and Procedural History
Koontz arose from an application for commercial development east of
Orlando, Florida. Coy Koontz, Sr. (“Koontz”), who purchased the property
the same governmental purpose” as would be accomplished by banning the proposed development altogether); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (“ ‘[R]ough proportionality’ best encapsulates . . . the requirement of the
Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is required, but [regulatory bodies] must make
some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature an extent
to the impact of the proposed development”).
13. 133 S. Ct. 2586.
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in question in 1972, sought to develop the northern 3.7 acre section of his
total 14.9 acres beginning in 1994. The property, located near the intersection of a secondary state highway and a toll-road approximately 40 miles
west of Florida’s east coast, consisted entirely of state-classified wetlands
of varying development suitability.14
In order to proceed to develop the property, Koontz needed to obtain
two permits. First, pursuant to Florida’s Water Resources Act, he needed to
obtain a Management and Storage of Surface Water permit.15 Second,
Koontz needed to obtain a Wetlands Resource Management permit pursuant
to the Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act.16 Koontz submitted
both permit applications to the St. Johns River Water Management District
(“District”), which was the statutorily-designated regional body responsible
for reviewing development proposals with the potential to impact water resources.17 Specifically, Koontz proposed to raise the base elevation of the
northern quarter of the property, install a stormwater runoff detention pond,
and encumber the remaining three-quarters of the property with a conservation easement in the District’s name.18
The District rejected Koontz’s proposal, but noted it would approve
the project if he either: (a) reduced the development footprint to one acre,
deeded the remaining 13.9 acres to the District, and modified both the
stormwater management and site grading plans; or (b) without modifying
the proposal, paid to make improvements to offsite District property.19
Under the second alternative, Koontz could avoid dedicating additional land
by paying money. Dissatisfied with the alternatives, Koontz filed suit in
Florida Circuit Court alleging a regulatory taking.20
14. Id. at 2592.
15. Id.; see Fla. Stat. §§ 373.403, 373.413 (2014) (authorizing state regulation of any “artificial . . .
construction that connects to, draws water from, drains water into, or is placed in or across the waters in
the state,” and conditioning of permits for such construction to avoid harm “to the water resources of the
district”).
16. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592; see Fla. Stat. § 373.414 (prohibiting development in wetland areas
which runs contrary to the public interest and authorizing a district to impose mitigation measures, in
part of the applicant’s choosing, including but not limited to “onsite mitigation, offsite mitigation, offsite
regional mitigation, and the purchase of mitigation credits from mitigation banks”).
17. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592; see Fla. Stat. §§ 373.026, 373.036, 373.069 (creating water management districts and enumerating district powers and duties).
18. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.
19. Id. at 2593 (“Specifically, petitioner could pay to replace culverts on one parcel or fill ditches
on another. Either of those projects would have enhanced approximately 50 acres of District-owned
wetlands. . . . [T]he District said it ‘would also favorably consider’ alternatives to its suggested offsite
mitigation projects if petitioner proposed something ‘equivalent.’ ”).
20. Id.; see Fla. Stat. § 373.617(2) (confining trial court review “solely to determining whether final
agency action is an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a taking without just
compensation”).
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The trial court initially granted the District’s motion to dismiss for
Koontz’s failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.21 However,
following appellate reversal and remand, the trial court held that in light of
Koontz’s proposal to dedicate the majority of the site to the District, “any
further mitigation in the form of payment for offsite improvements to District property lacked both nexus and rough proportionality to the environmental impact of the proposed construction.”22 When the intermediate appellate court upheld the trial court’s ruling following the remand, the District appealed to the Florida Supreme Court.23
The Florida Supreme Court reversed, ultimately holding that the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” standards articulated in Nollan
and Dolan apply only where: (a) “the condition/exaction sought by the government involves a dedication of or over the owner’s interest in real property in exchange for permit approval”; or (b) “the regulatory agency actually issues the permit sought, thereby rendering the owner’s interest in the
real property subject to the dedication imposed.”24 In other words, because
the District’s second alternative sought what amounted to a cash payment
from Koontz, albeit to perform specific improvements, rather than an interest in real property, and because the District ultimately denied Koontz’s
permit applications, the Florida Supreme Court deemed a Nollan and Dolan
analysis inapposite. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
2012, in part to resolve discrepant state and federal court interpretation of
the applicability of the Nollan and Dolan analysis referenced in the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision.25
B. Split of Authority
In its opinion, the Florida Supreme Court described a continuum of
how courts around the country have applied the Nollan and Dolan analysis.26 Some courts have limited heightened scrutiny only to those cases involving dedications of land.27 Others have applied heightened scrutiny to ad
hoc impositions involving non-real property.28 Still others have applied
heightened scrutiny where a non-real-property-based condition results from
21. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. St. Johns River Water Mgt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1230 (Fla. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct.
2586 (2013).
25. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594.
26. St. Johns River Water Mgt. Dist., 77 So. 3d at 1229–1230.
27. Id. (citing McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated by Koontz,
133 S. Ct. 2586).
28. Id. (citing Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996)).
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a generally applicable law. 29 The Koontz Court expressly rejected the former without adopting any of the limitations suggested by the latter, thereby
neglecting to limit the extension of heightened scrutiny in any meaningful
way.30 The split of authority that in part influenced the Supreme Court’s
decision to grant certiorari is grounded in different views as to the objective
protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.
In McClung v. City of Sumner,31 the Ninth Circuit held that exactions
are limited to real property.32 The case centered on a city ordinance that
required property owners, upon applying to develop their land, to upgrade
any adjacent municipal storm drainage facilities serving their parcels.33 The
court in part addressed whether the ordinance created a de facto monetary
exaction by requiring developers to outlay cash for upgrades. The court
noted that, even if the ordinance could be viewed as a monetary exaction
arguendo, Nollan and Dolan would not apply because “[a] monetary exaction differs from a land exaction—‘unlike real or personal property, money
is fungible.’ ”34 The court further concluded that the facilities expenditure
compelled in the plaintiffs’ case was the result of a legislative enactment
and represented “neither an individual, adjudicative decision, nor the requirement that the [plaintiffs] relinquish rights in their real property.”35 As
such, heightened scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan, indeed the Takings
Clause altogether, had no place at the table. Rather, the court held that “any
concerns of improper legislative development fees are better kept in check
by the ordinary restraints of the democratic political process,” as well as
through substantive due process.36 In short, the Fifth Amendment protects
real property, and money is not properly characterized as real property
under the Takings Clause.
Conversely, in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City,37 the California Supreme
Court expressed its view that the Takings Clause primarily serves to protect
individuals from bearing essentially public burdens imposed by government.38 Ehrlich involved Culver City’s imposition of a $280,000 recreational facilities fee in exchange for allowing the plaintiff to develop a con29. Id. (citing Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Ests. L.P., 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2003)).
30. See infra pts. IV(A) & V(B).
31. 548 F.3d 1219.
32. Id. at 1227–1229.
33. Id. at 1222–1223.
34. Id. at 1228 (citing U.S. v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n. 9 (1989) (“If [a government deduction taken directly from a financial award] were a physical occupation requiring just compensation, so
would be any fee for services, including a filing fee that must be paid in advance. Such a rule would be
an extravagant extension of Loretto.”)).
35. Id. at 1227.
36. Id. at 1228 (citations omitted).
37. 911 P.2d 429 (1996).
38. Id. at 444.
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dominium project.39 Faced in part with the question of whether heightened
scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan applies to this sort of monetary, “nonpossessory” exaction, the court couched its analysis in the following interpretation:
One of the central promises of the takings clause is that truly public
burdens will be publicly borne. Where the regulatory land use power of local
government is deployed against individual property owners through the use of
conditional permit exactions, the Nollan test helps to secure that promise by
assuring that the monopoly power over development permits is not illegitimately exploited by imposing conditions that lack any logical affinity to the
public impact of a particular land use. The essential nexus test is, in short, a
“means-ends” equation, intended to limit the government’s bargaining mobility in imposing permit conditions on individual property owners—whether
they consist of possessory dedications or the exaction of cash payments—
that, because they appear to lack any evident connection to the public impact
of the proposed land use, may conceal an illegitimate demand—may, in other
words, amount to out-and-out . . . extortion.
Under this view of the constitutional role of the consolidated “essential
nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests, it matters little whether the local
land use permit authority demands the actual conveyance of property or the
payment of a monetary exaction.40

Logically, if the Takings Clause’s mention of “private property” imposes no actual property requirement, but instead generally guarantees individual freedom from shouldering more of the public weight than individually warranted, then it does not matter in a constitutional sense whether the
individual gives more money or more land to the public than necessary—
more than warranted is still more than warranted. However, the court went
on to state that heightened scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan, while clearly
applicable to situations “when a local government imposes special, discretionary permit conditions on . . . individual property owners,” has not historically been applied when a development “exaction takes the form of a
generally applicable development fee or assessment.”41
Finally, the Texas Supreme Court in Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Limited Partnership applied the Takings Clause to generallyenacted legislation that, in aggregate, actually mimics adjudicative, one-off
development conditions.42 Flower Mound focused on a condition precedent
to subdivision approval, which required the plaintiff development partnership to improve a road abutting its property.43 The developer improved the
road, at a cost of nearly $500,000, and sued the town for compensation
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 434–435.
Id. at 444 (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 447 (emphasis in original).
135 S.W.3d at 640–642.
Id. at 623–624.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2015

7

Montana Law Review, Vol. 76 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 7
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\76-2\MON203.txt

366

unknown

Seq: 8

5-AUG-15

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

13:08

Vol. 76

under a takings theory thereafter.44 The Texas Supreme Court affirmed and
rejected the town’s argument that the requirement to upgrade the road, imposed pursuant to local subdivision regulations, operated as a use restriction
and was therefore immune from scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan. Contrary
to the McClung court’s characterization of money as fungible non-property,
the Flower Mound court held that the road upgrade requirement was “in no
sense a use restriction . . . [but instead was] much closer to a required dedication of property—that being the money to pay for the required improvement.”45 The court then parted ways with the Ehrlich court as well, holding
that a monetary exaction distinction based on the character of the imposition—legislative on the one hand versus ad hoc, or adjudicative on the
other—is a distinction without a legitimate difference. The court opined
that while it certainly makes sense to apply Nollan and Dolan to individualized monetary exactions, it also makes practical sense to apply heightened
scrutiny to monetary exactions resulting from generally applicable laws.46
The court theorized it is “entirely possible that the government could ‘gang
up’ on particular groups to force extractions that a majority of constituents
would not only tolerate but applaud, so long as burdens they would otherwise bear were shifted to others.”47 In short, the court concluded that a local
government can extort through a regulatory or statutory tool, abused repeatedly over time, as easily as it can alone in a back room with a single developer looking for approval. Thus, the court found no legitimate reason for
protecting one form of extortion while exposing the other to a more searching inquiry.
The preceding Takings Clause theories—heightened scrutiny under
Nollan and Dolan: (1) does not apply to monetary exactions, (2) applies
only to ad hoc monetary exactions, (3) applies to ad hoc and generally applicable monetary exactions—were squarely before the Koontz Court. The
Court clearly denounced the first theory and, unfortunately, decided against
adopting a theory as clear and complete as the latter two theories.
III. PRIOR APPLICABLE SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
Apart from Nollan and Dolan themselves, the primary question
presented in Koontz—whether heightened scrutiny applies at all where an
exaction is purely monetary—implicated a number of prior Supreme Court
Takings Clause cases. Indeed, much of the limited scholarship written todate on Koontz questions whether the decision itself is faithful to the line of
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 624.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 641.
Id.
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cases preceding it.48 Of particular interest are the Court’s opinions in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel49 and Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.50
In Eastern Enterprises, a plurality of the Court ruled that the Coal Act
of 1992, as retroactively and burdensomely applied to a particular company,
was unconstitutional.51 The Act itself represented a federal governmental
initiative to shore up monetary reserves in support of retiring coal mine
workers, particularly those who worked for companies in operation before
enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Such
companies, whether or not engaged in coal mining activities at the time of
passage of the Coal Act in 1992, were required to fractionally contribute to
employee retirement funds to guarantee some level of benefits for retiring
former employees.52 Eastern Enterprises, long since out of the coal business
by 1992, was required to contribute some $5,000,000 to the fund, a burden
held unacceptable in an opinion by Justice O’Connor.53
However, a majority of justices, including Justice Kennedy who concurred in the result but objected to the methodological path thereto, concluded that the Takings Clause was an inappropriate tool for striking down
the challenged legislation.54 As to using the Takings Clause in that manner,
Justice Kennedy stated the following:
Our cases do not support the plurality’s conclusion that the Coal Act
takes property. The Coal Act imposes a staggering financial burden on the
petitioner, Eastern Enterprises, but it regulates the former mine owner without
regard to property. It does not operate upon or alter an identified property
interest, and it is not applicable to or measured by a property interest. The
Coal Act does not appropriate, transfer, or encumber an estate in land (e.g., a
lien on a particular piece of property), a valuable interest in an intangible
(e.g., intellectual property), or even a bank account or accrued interest. The
law simply imposes an obligation to perform an act, the payment of benefits.
The statute is indifferent as to how the regulated entity elects to comply or the
property it uses to do so. To the extent it affects property interests, it does so
in a manner similar to many laws; but until today, none were thought to constitute takings. To call this sort of governmental action a taking as a matter of
48. E.g. Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 S. Ct. Rev. 287 (2013);
John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever? 22 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 1 (2014).
49. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
50. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
51. 524 U.S. at 538 (plurality).
52. Id. at 511–515.
53. Id. at 529–530 (“[L]egislation might be unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive liability
on a limited class of parties that could not have anticipated the liability, and the extent of the liability is
substantially disproportionate to the parties’ experience. We believe that the Coal Act’s allocation
scheme, as applied to Eastern, presents such a case. We reach that conclusion by applying the three
factors that traditionally have informed our regulatory takings analysis.”).
54. Id. at 553–556 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting), 539–543 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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constitutional interpretation is both imprecise and, with all due respect, unwise.55

Though not binding precedent,56 lower federal courts have generally
adopted what was the majority view in Eastern Enterprises—that legislation imposing only a monetary burden cannot effect a taking under the Fifth
Amendment.57
In Lingle, the Court very clearly enumerated the primary theories
available to parties seeking redress for an uncompensated taking under the
Fifth Amendment.58 The State of Hawaii enacted legislation designed to
protect individual gasoline service station operators in part by limiting the
monthly rent oil companies can charge its lessees for operating companyowned stations.59 Chevron sued the state over the statute, arguing at summary judgment that “the rent cap [did] not substantially advance any legitimate government interest,” and was therefore a taking.60 The parties argued
this so-called “substantially advances” takings test through two appeals to
the Ninth Circuit, until the case ultimately came before the Supreme Court
on the question of the appropriate standard of review for a takings claim.61
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O’Connor explained that “[t]he
paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property,” but that “government
regulation of private property may, in some instances, be so onerous that its
effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster.”62 The Court proceeded to survey the flavors of takings claims, ultimately concluding that
none relied upon the “substantially advances” test.63 This is because the test
improperly focuses on the validity of a piece of legislation, at the expense
of adequately accounting for the magnitude of the burden placed on an aggrieved party by the allegedly-offensive government action. 64 The Court
held that Fifth Amendment takings claims must proceed by alleging either:
(a) “a ‘physical’ taking,” (b) “a Lucas-type ‘total regulatory taking,’ ” (c) “a
Penn Central [ad hoc, non-per se] taking,” or (d) “a land-use exaction vio55. Id. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
56. See Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
57. See e.g. Swisher Int’l Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d 1046, 1054–1056 (11th Cir. 2008); Cmmw.
Edison Co. v. U.S., 271 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Employees’ Ret.
Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 58 (1st Cir. 1999).
58. 544 U.S. at 548.
59. Id. at 533.
60. Id. at 534.
61. Id. at 535–536.
62. Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 543.
64. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543 (“A test that tells us nothing about the actual burden imposed on
property rights, or how that burden is allocated, cannot tell us when justice might require that the burden
be spread among taxpayers through the payment of compensation.”).
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lating the standards set forth in Nollan and Dolan.”65 The Lingle decision
not only reduced clutter in the Court’s takings jurisprudence, but also reinforced the property requirement as a threshold question in takings claims: a
Fifth Amendment claim under the Takings Clause proceeds from the taking
of private property from its owner.66
IV. MAJORITY

AND

DISSENTING OPINIONS

IN

KOONTZ

With the factual, procedural, and precedential stages set, the Supreme
Court considered Koontz in the 2013 term. As this article is concerned with
the Court’s holding related to monetary exactions, the section of the holding
that discusses the applicability of heightened scrutiny to denied land use
development permits is not addressed.
A. Majority opinion and holding regarding monetary exactions
Justice Alito, writing for a five justice majority, held very simply that a
“government’s demand for property from a land-use permit applicant must
satisfy the requirements of Nollan and Dolan . . . even when its demand is
for money.”67 Without openly rejecting the conclusion reached by a majority of justices in Eastern Enterprises—that financial burden alone does not
support a takings claim—the Koontz majority stated that, in the land use
exaction context, exempting financial burdens from takings analysis would
permit local governments and regulators to impose conditions on property
owners which entirely evade Nollan and Dolan substantiation.68
For example, a local government could offer a developer two options
as conditions to permit approval: either dedicate real property or pay a monetary exaction in lieu of the dedication. The local government, according to
the majority, could fashion the dedication requirement in a way that bears
no essential nexus to any potential, legitimate reason for denying the permit, and is not roughly proportional to the impact of the development. The
developer, under such manifestly unjust compulsion, would choose the
cash-in-lieu option. However, without requiring local governments to craft
cash options with Nollan and Dolan in mind, the local government could in
effect force the developer to choose the option less protective of her Fifth
Amendment rights. Similarly, the local government could compel the developer to choose the dedication option by designing a cash option that offends
Nollan and Dolan. Under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, such
“options” represent a sort of constitutional Hobson’s choice because the
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 548.
U.S. Const. amend. V.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603.
Id. at 2599.
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landowner may make a financially expedient choice that nonetheless violates a constitutional right.69
The majority cited the above rationale as support for two substantial
and pivotal findings. First, Justice Alito declared that fees required and paid
in lieu of real property dedications “are functionally equivalent to other
types of land use exactions.”70 Second, and in an attempt to distinguish
Eastern Enterprises, Justice Alito stated that the difference between the retirement contributions required in that case and the payments for offsite
wetlands improvements in this case is that the former did “not operate upon
or alter an identified property interest,” whereas the latter do.71 Indeed, that
operation is the key—the majority noted that “[t]he fulcrum this case turns
on is the direct link between the government’s demand and a specific parcel
of real property.”72
The link between the monetary exaction and the specific parcel of land
is “direct” in Koontz, according to the majority, because the exaction burdens Coy Koontz’s “ownership” of that parcel.73 Because the exaction was
demanded in the context of Koontz owning a specific parcel:
[the] case implicates the central concern of Nollan and Dolan: the risk that the
government may use its substantial power and discretion in land-use permitting to pursue governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the effects of the proposed new use of the specific property at
issue, thereby diminishing without justification the value of the property.74

The last point rests upon an assumption as to the rights protected by the
Fifth Amendment and the Takings Clause, and implicates again the theories
explained by the lower courts in the section above. The Koontz majority
states that the monetary exaction at issue burdens ownership, and cites its
own past decisions as well as Florida law for the proposition that “the right
to receive income from land is an interest in real property.”75 While this
may be true insofar as liens, leases, and other existing property interests tied
69. Id. at 2599.
70. Id. (citing Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation:
Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. Rev. 177, 202–203 (2006)). Rosenberg notes that,
nationally, courts eventually accepted in-lieu fees because of their “ ‘equivalence’ to other mandatory
subdivision requirements.” The cases cited in support of this statement, all dating from the 1960s and
70s, clearly precede the Supreme Court’s cash-as-property policy statements in Eastern Enterprises and
Lingle. Further, the courts in those cases refer to dedications of a certain amount of land or the
equivalent value, in cash, of that land. Neither Rosenberg nor the cases he cites refer to any functional
equivalency between real property and monetary exactions, merely value equivalency.
71. Id. (quoting Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
72. Id. at 2600 (emphasis added).
73. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599.
74. Id. at 2600 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 2599–2600 (citing Palm Beach City v. Cove Club Investors Ltd., 734 So.2d 379, 383–384
(Fla. 1999)).
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to real property are concerned, the Court in Koontz—without explicitly stating so—appears to include as a protectable property interest the right to
develop and receive speculative income from a parcel of real property. This,
in turn, implicates the quid pro quo of development regulation, by seemingly placing the property owner’s development interest above the public’s
and government’s interests in health, safety, and welfare.76 Ultimately,
while the majority concludes the monetary exaction at issue in Koontz burdened property, the exaction likely operated simply to reduce the net profit
Koontz received from developing the property. Notably, the Court did not
decide whether the options presented by the District satisfied Nollan and
Dolan, and instead remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court.77
B. Justice Kagan’s dissent
Justice Kagan, writing for a four-justice dissenting minority, primarily
took issue with the monetary exactions portion of the majority opinion and
Justice Alito “run[ning] roughshod over Eastern Enterprises.”78 The main
thrust of the dissenting argument relies on Nollan and Dolan’s focus on
whether a government’s appropriation of the thing exacted would constitute
a taking outside the development permitting process.79 Stated another way,
“the Nollan-Dolan test applies only when the property the government demands during the permitting process is the kind it otherwise would have to
pay for.”80 Because, pursuant to the majority opinion in Eastern Enterprises, the government may demand money in the manner it did in Koontz
without compensating the payor, the demand itself is not and cannot be a
taking under the Fifth Amendment.81
The dissent notes the magnitude of the practical difficulties likely to
flow from the majority opinion, despite the majority’s assurance otherwise;
not the least of which is the potential for confusion between apparently
permissible user fees and taxes versus the monetary exactions required to
answer a more stringent calling.82 Importantly, Justice Kagan suggests the
76. See Ridgefield Land Co. v. Det., 217 N.W. 58 (Mich. 1928); c.f. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548
(1897) (acknowledging that the public bears some social and economic burden for the development
activities of individual landowners).
77. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603.
78. Id. at 2603–2604 (Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2605 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 (“Had California simply required the Nollans to
make an easement across their beachfront available to the public . . ., rather than conditioning their
permit to rebuild their house on their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt there would have been a
taking.”) and Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 (“[H]ad the city simply required petitioner to dedicate a strip of
land . . . for public use, rather than conditioning the grant of her permit to develop her property on such a
dedication, a taking would have occurred.”)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2607–2609.
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majority holding might have been cabined by adopting a rule applying Nollan and Dolan where the imposition of a monetary exaction results from an
ad hoc, adjudicative proceeding, as in Ehrlich.83 Ultimately, the dissent
summed up its issues with the majority opinion by stating:
The majority’s errors here are consequential. The majority turns a broad array
of local land-use regulations into federal constitutional questions. It deprives
state and local governments of the flexibility they need to enhance their communities—to ensure environmentally sound and economically productive development. It places courts smack in the middle of the most everyday local
government activity. As those consequences play out across the country, I
believe the Court will rue today’s decision.84

V. THE LIKELY IMPACT

OF

KOONTZ

ON

MONETARY EXACTIONS

Koontz very generally requires that monetary payments due in fulfillment of a condition precedent to development must share an essential nexus
with and be roughly proportional to the impacts the development will have
on a community. This section explores the nature and types of programs to
which this standard will likely apply, the likely impact the standard will
have on those programs, and theoretical means for diffusing that impact.
A. Typical monetary exactions in land use planning
The term “monetary exaction” is essentially synonymous with a fee or
a “development charge” imposed as a condition of approval of a proposed
land use. Such charges find their historical origin in a local government’s
need to have a developer pay for the provision of essential services to a
site.85 Over time, and largely in response to a drastic uptick in housing
construction after World War II, local governments began imposing fees on
developers not only to offset the costs of onsite services, but to mitigate
offsite, community-wide impacts of additional housing development. At
least two explanations support the proliferation of so-called “impact fees.”
First, local officials are pressured politically to keep the financial burdens
of development confined to developers and newcomers so that taxpayers
avoid absorbing those costs.86 Second, “the expansion of popular concern
for the environment . . . has eroded the traditional belief in the benefits of
never-ending growth.”87 In short, society has come to recognize that while
83. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
84. Id. at 2612.
85. Cullingworth & Caves, supra n. 1, at 109 (noting that the typical services supported by imposed
fees historically included “streets, sidewalks, street lighting, and local water and sewage lines” and that
“[s]ervices external to the development were paid for by the appropriate suppliers”).
86. Id. at 109–110.
87. Id. at 110.
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development is necessary to a degree, its limitation is a worthwhile consideration, and its primary costs should be borne by its primary beneficiaries.
Modern fee imposition practice at the state and local level covers an
array of services and impacts, including “schools, transportation, area and
regional street programs, day care, ‘green’ buildings, public safety, pollution mitigation, including stormwater drainage and flood control, wastewater treatment, parks and recreation, and affordable housing.”88 As subdivision development in particular proceeds fractionally, one parcel at a time,
it is common for local governments to impose fees for certain services or
impacts on individual subdividers, with the goal of collecting those fees and
pursuing some aggregate project serving multiple subdivisions, rather than
requiring each successive developer to contribute a small piece of land or
particular stretch of infrastructure.89 Park development is particularly wellsuited for imposition of fees-in-lieu of physical dedications because park
planning generally occurs more broadly than at the individual subdivision
level.90
That in-lieu fee programs must be crafted and implemented in a manner that comports with Nollan, Dolan, and the Takings Clause is not necessarily the most pernicious aspect of Justice Alito’s opinion in Koontz, again
assuming the decision applies to both ad hoc and uniformly applicable fees.
Indeed, nationally, many of these types of programs, and the statutes that
authorize them, incorporate some level of analysis intended to establish
both a nexus between the fee and the proposed development and proportionality of the fee value with the project’s impact.91 Instead, as Justice
Kagan noted writing for the dissent, simply subjecting the range of local
88. James A. Kushner, Subdivision Law & Growth Management vol. 1, § 6:29 (2d ed. 2001) (footnotes omitted).
89. Id.
90. Id. at § 6:30 (“In many communities and neighborhoods, comprehensive park plans may rely on
regional rather than neighborhood parks, or there may already be a large park developed or proposed on
a neighboring tract. . . . In such cases it makes good sense to develop the park plan and, in lieu of land
dedication, require the subdivider to pay a fee equal in value to the land dedication to support the park
development program.”). Certainly other programs with community-wide orientation are well-suited to
in-lieu fee collection as well, including resource protection programs (open space, riparian/wetland,
agricultural soils) and fire response.
91. See e.g. Cal. Gov. Code § 66477(a)(2) (2014) (Quimby Act); Cal. Gov. Code § 66477(a)(3)(B);
Cal. Gov. Code § 66477(a)(3)(A); Cal. Gov. Code § 66477(a)(3)(B); See also Cullingworth & Caves,
supra n. 1, at 111 (proposing a model basis for calculating fees as: “(1) the cost of existing facilities; (2)
the means by which existing facilities have been financed; (3) the extent to which a new development
has already contributed, through tax assessments, to the cost of providing existing excess capacity; (4)
the extent to which new development will, in the future, contribute to the cost of constructing currently
existing facilities used by everyone in the community or by people who do not occupy the new development; (5) the extent to which the new development should receive credit for providing common facilities
that communities have provided in the past without to charge to other developments in the service area;
(6) extraordinary costs incurred in serving the new development; and (7) the time-price differential in
fair comparisons of amounts paid at different times”).
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government programs imposing in-lieu fees to takings claims represents the
primary on-the-ground threat of the Koontz decision.92 If at least part of the
impetus for many local government in-lieu fee programs flows from decreased operating funds and revenue, then forcing those same local governments to defend any or all of their programs against constitutional attacks
will only exacerbate the problem that necessitated the programs in the first
place.
B. Potential doctrinal limitations on Koontz
There may be more than one way to limit the extent to which Koontz
applies to monetary exactions; the Court could itself prudentially limit how
the decision applies in the future.93 This section explores several avenues in
this regard, from simply limiting Koontz to true in-lieu fees as in Koontz’s
case, to limiting based on the nature of the law authorizing the fee, to limiting through a vesting statute.
1. True in-lieu fees
One possible limitation on Koontz flows simply from a narrow reading
and application of the decision. As discussed above, the Koontz majority
held that heightened scrutiny applies to monetary exactions that are directly
linked to an ownership interest in real property, i.e. when a “monetary obligation burden[s] . . . ownership of a specific parcel of land.”94 This could be
read to mean that the link exists when, but for the option to pay a fee, a
development condition would directly affect the extent of the physical ownership of the parcel in question. Thus, Nollan and Dolan could apply only
to those instances where the proposed fee specifically stands in place of the
dedication. When a local government calculates the dollar value of the inlieu fee based upon the fair market value of the real property dedication that
the fee replaces, the direct link is likely at its strongest, for the landowner is
essentially paying market rate simply to maintain his ownership position. A
benefit-of-the-doubt reading of Koontz suggests the majority may have implicitly intended to limit its holding to true in-lieu fee scenarios.95
92. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2612 (Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
93. Fennell & Peñalver, supra n. 48, at 339–347; Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the
Takings Clause, 41 Ecol. L.Q. 131, 135–136 (2014) (suggesting a distinction between fees and expenditures, the substantive difference between the two being that with the former the government actually
acquires something, even if the intent is to immediately divest of that thing, while with the latter the
government never gains possession).
94. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599 (majority).
95. Id. at 2601–2602 (“This case therefore does not affect the ability of governments to impose
property taxes, user fees, and similar laws and regulations that may impose financial burdens on property owners. . . . [The District] has maintained throughout this litigation that it considered [Koontz’s]
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2. Legislative vs. ad hoc fees
Another possible limitation centers on the distinction between adjudicative and legislative development conditions. Generally, an adjudicative
imposition flows from some “discretionary, piecemeal” decision or action
on the part of a local government, while a legislative imposition flows from
a “broad, prospective enactment,” typically in the form of a zoning ordinance or set of subdivision regulations.96 Indeed, the Koontz dissent urged
precisely this limiting distinction—subjecting the former types of exactions
to heightened scrutiny while leaving the latter to rest on some legitimate
governmental interest under substantive due process.97
At least three reasons support the Supreme Court adopting this rule in
future exactions cases. First and foremost, by favoring impositions resulting
from legislative enactments, the Court would strongly support the rule of
law, which itself “fosters freedom by increasing the predictability and intelligibility of the regulatory landscape within which the citizen operates and
by constraining officials from exercising unfettered discretion.”98 For the
most part, where an exaction flows from a duly enacted, publicly vetted
law, it is more likely to be general, stable, and anticipated over time and
from one landowner to the next.99 Second, a robust, albeit varied, state-level
jurisprudence exists regarding the distinction between legislative and adjudicative local government action.100 Where state court treatment of the distinction is well-defined, local governments may find their in-lieu fee programs prone to fewer legal challenges, or at least that the programs are
more apt to withstand those challenges. Finally, such a distinction “would
successfully immunize taxes, broadly applicable fees, and many aspects of
zoning from heightened scrutiny,”101 while leaving open the possibility of a
Penn Central challenge if those legislative conditions go too far.
Clearly the Koontz majority passed on the adjudicative/legislative distinction as a limitation on Nollan and Dolan in the monetary exaction context,102 and the distinction itself is not foolproof.103 However, employing
money to be a substitute for his deeding to the public a conservation easement on a larger parcel of . . .
land.”) (emphasis added); see also Elizabeth Tisher, Student Author, Land-Use Regulation After
Koontz: Will We “Rue” the Court’s Decision? 38 Vt. L. Rev. 743, 764 (2014) (suggesting that the Court
may have applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in this case specifically “because the monetary demand . . . [was] a protected property interest under the Fifth Amendment”).
96. Fennell & Peñalver, supra n. 48, at 340.
97. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
98. Fennell & Peñalver, supra n. 48, at 311, 341.
99. Id. at 341–342.
100. Id. at 342.
101. Id.
102. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600–2602 (majority). Indeed, the Koontz majority found no reason to
limit the scope of its decision because it “d[id] not affect the ability of governments to impose property
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the distinction as an initial filter on claims against local governments
would, at the least, likely limit the number of complaints that county and
city attorneys are called upon to answer, while still addressing the more
insidious threat of local governments extortionately singling out particular
developers in adjudicative settings.104
3. Vesting statutes
If the primary reason that heightened scrutiny applied in Koontz was
because of the direct link between the exaction and a specific piece of property, then the statutory solution as it pertains to cash-in-lieu programs might
be to somehow sever the direct link. Doing so may be impossible—local
governments only demand development-related monetary exactions when
an applicant seeks to develop land in some way, and so the exaction is
always directly linked to some property-based action for which the applicant needs the government’s approval. However, there may be room for
such a limitation in state statutes governing vesting of development rights.
Another way of thinking about the relationship between a monetary
exaction and a specific parcel of real property is to cast the exaction not as
“diminishing . . . the value of the property”105 at issue in the development
proposal, but as potentially diminishing the profit derived from the development itself. Applying such a “potential-profit” exactions theory, the direct
link exists not between the exaction and a specific property interest, but
between the exaction and a specific proposed property use; the analysis
begins to resemble the Court’s ad hoc regulatory takings balancing.106 Nottaxes, user fees, and similar laws and regulations that may impose financial burdens on property owners.” Id. at 2601.
103. As the Flower Mound court noted, it is entirely possible that local governments could abuse and
extort landowners seeking development permits through the use of some legislatively-enacted regulatory
tool. Town of Flower Mound, 135 S.W.3d at 641. Fennell & Peñalver simply contend that extortion is
less likely to occur when a bargain results from legislation as opposed to individualized negotiation.
Fennell & Peñalver, supra n. 48, at 345–346.
104. Fennell & Peñalver, supra n. 48, at 320 (Nollan and Dolan principally serve the “goals of
ferreting out bad government behavior that, among other things, might allow it to take from owners in a
tricky or sneaky manner.” (internal punctuation omitted)).
105. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600.
106. See Penn C. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 124–125 (1978) (identifying the particularly
significant factors in ad hoc regulatory takings analysis as: (1) “[t]he economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant,” (2) “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations,” and (3) “the character of the government action,” that is “a physical invasion” versus “a
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good”); see
also Israel Piedra, Confusing Regulatory Takings with Regulatory Exactions: The Supreme Court Gets
Lost in the Swamp of Koontz, 41 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 555, 564 (2014) (“In cases such as Koontz, the
governmental body in question is admittedly burdening the applicant’s property interest when it conditions use of that property . . . on a monetary expenditure. This does not necessarily move the Court’s
analysis from the Penn Central test, however, which protects generally against excessive governmental
regulation of property, to the more specific Nollan/Dolan framework.” (footnotes omitted)). Of course
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withstanding that a property owner’s future plans are factored into the Penn
Central inquiry, it seems an inappropriate stretch to recognize a protectable
property interest in a landowner’s hopes, plans, or back-of-the-napkin
sketches and calculations. Even assuming a Fifth Amendment shelter, it
seems equally inappropriate to analyze infringement on a speculative property-based revenue stream under the Court’s exactions jurisprudence as developed to this point.107 This gets back to the theories of Takings Clause
applicability—what does the Fifth Amendment protect? Property, the value
of property, or the value one intends to extract from property given alignment of all logistical stars?108
The Koontz majority in part cited Florida law as specifically conferring
a right to a revenue stream derived from private property.109 Again, it was
the direct link between the monetary exaction, the specific parcel of real
property, and the burden imposed by the exaction on Coy Koontz’s “ownership” of the property, which supported applying Nollan and Dolan to the
exaction in the first place. But as discussed above, the underlying aspect of
ownership affected in Koontz was not any of the traditional “bundle of
sticks,”110 but rather a right to profit contingent on local government acquiescence. What if state law, even a state constitution, could be drafted or
revised to preempt such a contingent constitutional right?
Vesting statutes generally “create criteria for determining when a landowner has achieved or acquired a right to develop his or her property in a
particular manner, which cannot be abolished or restricted by regulatory
the Penn Central Court expressly noted its own affirmation of the “wide variety of contexts [in which]
government may execute laws or programs that adversely affect recognized economic values.” Penn C.
Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
107. See Pidot, supra n. 93, at 136–137; see also William L. Want, Economic Substantive Due
Process: Considered Dead is Being Revived by a Series of Supreme Court Land-Use Cases, 36 U. Haw.
L. Rev. 455, 479 (2014) (unflatteringly likening Koontz to Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and
positing that “[p]rior to Nollan and Dolan, Supreme Court precedent held that property rights, like other
economic rights, were to be examined by the courts under the rational basis standard”).
108. Echeverria, supra n. 48, at 38–39 (“[T]he Court’s takings jurisprudence does not protect
wealth. It protects property . . . . Given this understanding of the scope of ‘property’ for the purposes of
the Takings Clause, a condition requiring the payment of money cannot be regarded as ‘functionally
equivalent’ to a condition exacting an interest in land.”). Note that the Koontz majority gets to its “direct
link” analysis only by first determining that “ ‘in lieu of’ fees are . . . functionally equivalent to other
types of land use exactions.” Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599. Dispel functional equivalence, and the direct
link is severed.
109. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600.
110. See Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based Resource, 32 Envtl. L. 773, 774 n. 1 (2002) (noting that “the standard incidents of ownership include the
rights to possession, use, management, income, capital, security, and transmissibility”); see also U.S. v.
Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278–279 (2002) (“A common idiom describes property as a “bundle of sticks”—a
collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute property. State law determines
only which sticks are in a person’s bundle. Whether those sticks qualify as ‘property’ [for federal purposes] is a question of federal law.”) (citations omitted).
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provisions subsequently enacted.”111 Vesting statutes are analytically
grounded in estoppel, though courts have held them invalid as encroaching
upon or restricting exercise of the police power.112 The typical vesting statute requires some significant investment in the development project in order
for the right to develop to become fixed in the landowner-applicant.113
Whether investment in a particular project has risen to a level of significance sufficient to vest a right to develop is generally determined on a caseby-case basis.114
The above concepts, codified in detail in a state statutory scheme,
could serve to determine when a landowner has invested enough in a particular project that imposing a constitutionally-infirm monetary exaction
would burden her ownership of the particular parcel.115 The statute could
identify the point at which a developer’s right to proceed with—and, ostensibly, profit from—a development project has vested to the extent a monetary exaction actually burdens a right, rather than simply an expectation.116
The point at which the expectation becomes a right would be the point at
which the “direct link” is established, and the point at which the exaction
itself must satisfy Nollan and Dolan scrutiny.
VI. AN APPLIED EXAMPLE OF KOONTZ: CASH
OF PARKLAND DEDICATION

IN

LIEU

Exactions come due by virtue of legislative requirements may be constitutionally safer than those demanded as a result of some ad hoc negotiation during an adjudicative process. However, that safety may be negated if
the legislation treats differently situated parties too similarly.117 A solution,
111. Am. Plan. Ass’n, Growing Smart Legislative Guidebook: Model Statutes for Planning and the
Management of Change 8-95 (Stuart Meck ed., 2002) (available at http://perma.cc/R6UR-9KCS (https://
www.planning.org/growingsmart/guidebook/print/pdf/ chapter8.pdf)).
112. Id. at 8-95 to 8-96. (“For the development rights to be vested, the government must have made
a decision and the landowner must have, in good faith, relied, to his or her detriment, on that decision by
making some improvement to the land or some other commitment of resources.”).
113. Id. at 8-96.
114. Id.
115. Indeed, in the due process context, the United States Supreme Court identified state statutory
schemes as the primary source of protectable property interests. Bd. of Regents of St. Colleges v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“Property interests . . . are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”).
116. As to the subdivision application process, the Montana Supreme Court answered the question of
when a development right vests as a protectable property interest for substantive due process purposes in
Kiely Constr. LLC v. City of Red Lodge, 57 P.3d 836, 847–848 (Mont. 2002). The court held that a
subdivider can establish a protected property interest as early as application for final subdivision plat
approval, so long as all conditions upon which the local government approved the preliminary plat have
been met.
117. Fennell & Peñalver, supra n. 48, at 321.
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then, could be a generally applicable (i.e. anti-extortionate, theoretically uncorruptible) legislative enactment with an abundance of predictable flexibility—enough to foreclose the vicissitudes of local government officials
while avoiding unfair uniform treatment.118 This section explores a sampling of state statutes authorizing local government acceptance of cash in
lieu of dedications of real property for parks and recreational facilities, and
identifies examples which strike a seemingly appropriate balance between
prescription and discretion.
A. Parkland dedication generally
The Standard City Planning Enabling Act of 1928, in recommending
the permissible scope of subdivision regulations, provided that while “planning commissions” should “be primarily concerned” with the “arrangement
of streets,” they should also “be empowered to take into account the adequate supply of open spaces for . . . recreation, . . . for healthful population
densities, and for other public benefits.”119 The Act also provided that local
governments may accept bonding “[i]n lieu of the completion of [required]
improvements and utilities prior to the final approval of the plat.”120 The
Act was not initially interpreted to permit cash payments in lieu of providing essential services, but over time the practice became legally acceptable.121
Parks are unique in the development context in at least two respects.122
First, unlike many of the basic onsite improvements required to ensure that
a project functions and can support residents or intended occupancies, park
facilities may be located offsite and aggregated with other facilities in order
to serve a greater portion of the population.123 Second, while local govern118. Id. at 345 (“Where embedded bargains put broad discretion in the hands of regulators, and
where regulators use that discretion to impose one-off exactions on landowners on a case-by-case basis,
the mere fact that they do so pursuant to the language of a zoning code would not justify treating their
impositions as ‘legislative.’ Particularly in the state courts, judges have shown a willingness to scrutinize
legislative enactments that place unbridled discretion in the hands of land use administrators. But where
the embedded bargains employ publicly available terms that are spelled out in detail and broadly available – as in incentive zoning – the scheme seems far more legislative in nature and the case for judicial
scrutiny is weaker.”) (footnotes omitted); compare Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion and the
Gatehouse, 46 Urb. Law. 1, 24 (2014) (noting that “fine-grained ordinances setting out requisites for
development would be transparent,” albeit subject to other potential challenges) with Robert H. Freilich
& Neil M. Popowitz, How Local Governments Can Resolve Koontz’s Prohibitions on Ad Hoc Land Use
Restrictions, 45 Urb. Law. 971, 980–983 (2013) (“[M]unicipalities must implement nonflexible, definitive, local legislative solutions to the flexibility questions generated by Koontz.”).
119. Advisory Comm. on City Plan. & Zoning of the U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, A Standard City
Planning Enabling Act 27 n. 70 (Gov’t Printing Off. 1928).
120. Id. at 28.
121. Rosenberg, supra n. 70, at 199–200 (footnotes omitted).
122. Am. Plan. Ass’n, supra n. 111, at 8-130.
123. Id.
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ments often own and operate improvements such as streets and sewer infrastructure and installation, special districts frequently operate park facilities,
an arrangement that may require “a procedure for coordinating the needs of
the school or park district with the exaction and impact fee powers of the
local government.”124
B. State parkland dedication statutes
Nationally, state statutory approaches to authorizing payments in lieu
of parkland dedication vary greatly, both in the standards by which local
government decisions are to be made and in the amount of discretion afforded local government officials. The following statutory examples represent a sort of discretion continuum, with full discretion and sparse legislative decision-making guidance on the one end, and highly circumscribed,
finite legislative options on the other.
1. Washington
The State of Washington has taken an interesting approach to governing dedications and fees-in-lieu in the subdivision context.125 At the outset, in order for the local government to approve a subdivision, the proposal
itself must make provisions for parks and recreational facilities.126 The local government may facilitate that provision by requiring “[d]edication of
land to any public body, provision of public improvements to serve the
subdivision, and/or impact fees.”127 However, the statute prohibits any
“dedication, provision of public improvements, or impact fees . . . that constitutes an unconstitutional taking of private property.”128 The statute provides no further guidance as to how a local government might avoid a taking. Further, the statutory prohibition itself is likely gratuitous, presuming
local government attorneys advise their governing body clients not to violate the Constitution as a matter of course.
2. Wisconsin
Similar to Washington state law, Wisconsin’s park dedication statute
provides no guidance as to methods for calculating in-lieu dedications, nor
does it provide for any embedded discretionary options.129 The statute
states simply:
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Wash. Rev. Code § 58.17.110 (2014).
Id. at § 58.17.110(2)(a).
Id. at § 58.17.110(2)(b).
Id.
Wis. Stat. § 236.45(6)(b) (2013).
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Any land dedication, easement, or other public improvement or fee for the
acquisition or initial improvement of land for a public park that is required by
a municipality, town, or county as a condition of approval under this chapter
[governing subdivision] must bear a rational relationship to a need for the
land dedication, easement, or other public improvement or parkland acquisition or initial improvement fee resulting from the subdivision or other division of land and must be proportional to the need.130

This standard, while it incorporates a notion of proportionality akin to Dolan, its requirement of a “rational relationship” between any imposed exaction and a need for park facilities resulting from a subdivision may fall short
of Nollan’s “essential nexus” test.131 Again, though local government attorneys likely advise Wisconsin’s governing bodies of the importance of findings, in the absence of guidelines for making a particularized determination,
the statute invites unconstitutional local government discretion.
3. Maine
Similarly, Maine state law requires nothing more than a “reasonable”
relationship between the impact of a proposed development and fees imposed as mitigation.132 Local governments are authorized by statute to “requir[e] the construction of off-site capital improvements or the payment of
impact fees instead of the construction.”133 Such improvements include
“[p]arks and other open space or recreational areas.”134 Any fee imposed
“must be reasonably related to the development’s share of the cost of infrastructure improvements made necessary by the development.”135 Where a
development proposes to utilize existing infrastructure installed by the local
government, any fee imposed “must be reasonably related to the portion or
percentage of the infrastructure used by the development.”136
4. Montana
Generally, Montana law permits local governments to “require [developers] to pay or guarantee payment for part or all of the costs of extending
capital facilities related to public health and safety, including but not lim130. Id.
131. See Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 448 (Wis. 1965) (“[A] required
dedication of land for school, park or recreational sites as a condition for approval of the subdivision plat
should be upheld as a valid exercise of police power if the evidence reasonably establishes that the
municipality will be required to provide more land for schools, parks and playgrounds as a result of
approval of the subdivision.”).
132. 30-A Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4354 (2015).
133. Id.
134. Id. at § 4354(1)(A)(6).
135. Id. at § 4354(2)(A).
136. Id.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2015

23

Montana Law Review, Vol. 76 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 7
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\76-2\MON203.txt

382

unknown

Seq: 24

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

5-AUG-15

13:08

Vol. 76

ited to public roads, sewer lines, water supply lines, and storm drains to a
subdivision,” so long as the “costs . . . reasonably reflect the expected impacts directly attributable to the subdivision.”137
In the context of subdivision review, local governments have flexibility in the manner in which they enforce the state law requirement that a
developer dedicate parkland.138 In unzoned areas or areas for which a
growth policy does not prescribe density requirements, developers must
dedicate a percentage of the total acreage they intend to develop as residential lots to parkland.139 For example, where zoning or a growth policy do
provide density standards, a governing body is authorized to require a parkland dedication consistent with public needs and in lieu of the formulas
provided under § 76–3–621(1).
Local governments may, after conferring with and giving consideration to the preference of the developer of a particular subdivision, “determine suitable locations for parks and playgrounds” and “determine whether
the park dedication must be a land donation, cash donation, or a combination of both.”140 Though state law requires local governments to use “dedicated money or land for development, acquisition, or maintenance of parks
to serve the subdivision,” the local government also has discretion to “use
the dedicated money to acquire, develop, or maintain, within its jurisdiction, parks or recreational areas or for the purchase of public open space or
conservation easements.”141 However, the local government may only exercise that discretion if “the park, recreational area, open space, or conservation easement is within a reasonably close proximity to the proposed subdivision; and . . . the governing body has formally adopted a park plan that
establishes the needs and procedures for use of the money.”142 Beyond this
primary discretionary provision, local governments may waive the statutory
parkland dedication requirement if the subdivider proposes some acceptable
alternative means of preserving land in the same or greater amounts as required under the dedication calculation formulas in § 76–3–621(1).143
The only reported decision of the Montana Supreme Court that implicates the state’s parkland dedication statute did not address a challenge to
the contents of the statute, let alone its constitutionality.144 In Fielder v.
Board of County Commissioners, the plaintiffs, aggrieved property owners,
sued Sanders County, Montana in part over its acceptance of a cash dona137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Mont. Code Ann. § 76–3–510(1) (2013).
Id. at § 76–3–621.
Id. at § 76–3–621(1)(a)–(d).
Id. at § 76–3–621(4).
Id. at § 76–3–621(5).
Id. (emphasis added).
Mont. Code Ann. § 76–3–621(7)–(9).
Fielder v. Bd. of Co. Comm’rs, 162 P.3d 67, 70 (Mont. 2007).
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tion from the developer of a local subdivision project in lieu of dedication
of real property.145 On appeal of the district court’s finding that the
county’s acceptance of the cash payment was not arbitrary, the 2007 Montana Supreme Court simply noted that state statute authorized the commissioners to act precisely as they did under the circumstances.146 The court
had no occasion to evaluate the statute, and indeed at that time there was no
judicial indication that the statute was subject to heightened scrutiny under
Nollan and Dolan.
In 1964, the Montana Supreme Court did review the constitutionality
of the statutory predecessor to the above provisions.147 However, the crux
of the court’s analysis in Billings Properties Inc. v. Yellowstone County
received specific negative attention in Dolan, and calls into question the
adequacy of the test presently codified at § 76–3–621.148 In Billings
Properties, the statute at issue contained no language instructing local governments as to the degree of connection between a development and its
impacts on parks necessary to sustain a parkland dedication condition; the
statute simply made clear that such a condition must flow from the police
power.149 Given the statute’s shortcoming, the court proceeded, as did
many other state courts at the time, from the deferential notion that any
“exercise of the police power is gauged by a standard of reasonableness.”150
Not surprisingly, as to the constitutionality of Montana’s parkland dedication statute, the court found it a reasonable authorization of local government protection of health, safety, and welfare.151
Nollan and Dolan specifically elected not to adopt a reasonableness
standard, and thus a “reasonable” connection between the impact of a development and a parkland dedication condition imposed to mitigate it is insufficient.152 Nevertheless, “reasonableness” is precisely the post on which
Montana’s cash-in-lieu statute pivots.153 Local governments may spend
“dedicated money to acquire, develop, or maintain . . . parks or recreational
areas or for the purchase of public open space or conservation easements”
anywhere within their jurisdiction, be it a 28 square mile city or a 2,800
square mile county, in part so long as “the park, recreational area, open
145. Id. at 68–69.
146. Id. at 70.
147. Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone Co., 394 P.2d 182, 188–190 (Mont. 1964).
148. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389 (“In some states, very generalized statements as to the necessary connection between the required dedication and the proposed development seem to suffice. We think [the
standard in Montana, as quoted in Billings Properties] is too lax to adequately protect petitioner’s right
to just compensation if her property is taken for a public purpose.”).
149. Billings Properties, 394 P.2d at 184–185.
150. Id. at 186.
151. Id. at 187–188.
152. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836–837; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
153. Mont. Code Ann. § 76–3–621(5)(b)(i).
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space, or conservation easement is within a reasonably close proximity to
the proposed subdivision.”154 Apart from the developed-area-percentage requirements in § 76–3–621(1), which would operate to determine the
amount to be paid in lieu, this test on its own fails to accommodate an
adequate “individualized determination that the required [monetary] dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”155
5. California
California law provides that “the dedication of land, or the payment of
fees, or both, shall not exceed the proportionate amount necessary to provide three acres of park area per 1,000 persons residing within a subdivision.”156 However, where “the amount of existing neighborhood and community park area, as calculated pursuant to this subdivision, exceeds that
limit, . . . the legislative body may adopt the calculated amount as a higher
standard not to exceed five acres per 1,000 persons residing within a subdivision.”157 The alternative five-acre standard is discretionary on the part of
a local government.158 So long as the alternative standard is “consistent
with the [local government’s] general plan,” meaning “considering all of its
aspects . . . [the standard] will further the objectives and policies of the
general plan,” courts are unlikely to view adoption of the five-acre standard
as an abuse of discretion.159
California law requires particularized findings in order for a local government to use fees collected in lieu of parkland dedication for an offsite
purpose.160 Notwithstanding those findings, the default local government
use of land or fees must be in a manner that directly serves the proposed
development.161 However, the local government may use the fees offsite if:
(1) the fees are used to develop parkland in an underserved neighborhood;
(2) the local government holds a public hearing before using the fees; (3)
the local government “makes a finding supported by substantial evidence
that it is reasonably foreseeable that future inhabitants of the subdivision for
which the fee is imposed will use the proposed park and recreational facilities in the neighborhood where the fees are used”; and (4) the fees are used
154. Id.
155. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
156. Cal. Gov. Code § 66477(a)(2).
157. Id.
158. Homebuilders Ass’n of Tulare/Kings Cos., Inc. v. City of Lemoore, 185 Cal. App. 4th 554, 568
(Cal. App. 5th Dist. 2010).
159. Id. at 569.
160. Cal. Gov. Code § 66477(a)(3)(B).
161. Id. at § 66477(a)(3)(A).
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within areas previously-identified in a park plan.162 These provisions are
not read to require that fees or land primarily benefit residents of a certain
development, but merely to require that fees or land collected for park and
recreational facilities are used for those purposes over all others.163
C. Bolstering cash-in-lieu of parkland statutes and conditions
The above sampling presages what is likely to be the practical longterm reality of Koontz—few, if any, states have codified cash-in-lieu of
land dedication statutes capable of facially and apparently foreclosing a
constitutional challenge under Nollan and Dolan. The California statute discussed above, with its extensive formulas for calculating land or money
dedications and its numerous circumstantial options, likely strikes the right
balance between flexibility on the one hand and the anti-extortion concerns
of “generality, publicity, prospectivity, . . . congruence” and stability on the
other.164 Montana’s statute fares similarly well, in that local governments
are able to address conditions on the ground, yet are provided specific
guidelines for doing so. While only the Washington statute expressly includes the federal Takings Clause standard in its text, the statute provides
no guidance whatsoever as to how to meet that standard and ultimately sets
the stage for primarily adjudicative exactions decisions.165 Wisconsin’s feein-lieu statute is similarly drafted and presents similar issues, as is Maine’s
statute.
Simply offering a developer a choice from a number of canned options
does not necessarily curtail the possibility of local government imposing an
unconstitutional condition in exchange for a permit. However, a statute authorizing a local government to offer a developer a choice between a formulaic exaction and one for which she is able to negotiate may be a viable
alternative as well.166 At bottom, the “sweet spot” from a regulatory sense
likely resides in a statute codifying as many options as possible. Where
162. Id. at § 66477(a)(3)(B).
163. Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606,
612 n. 6 (Cal. 1971) (“It is difficult to see why, in the light of the need for recreational facilities
described above and the increasing mobility of our population, a subdivider’s fee in lieu of dedication
may not be used to purchase or develop land some distance from the subdivision but which would also
be available for use by subdivision residents. If, for example, the governing body of a city has determined, as has the city in the present case, that a specific amount of park land is required for a stated
number of inhabitants, if this determination is reasonable, and there is a park already developed close to
the subdivision to meet the needs of its residents, it seems reasonable to employ the fee to purchase land
in another area of the city for park purposes to maintain the proper balance between the number of
persons in the community and the amount of park land available.”).
164. Fennell & Peñalver, supra n. 48, at 341–342. The authors’ point here is well-taken: there is
stability in legislation to the extent it remains unamended session-to-session.
165. Wash. Rev. Code § 58.17.110(2)(b).
166. Fennell & Peñalver, supra n. 48, at 350.
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everything is on the table from the moment a developer meets with a local
government land use planner, and where a particularized determination is
possible but discretion is bridled, a local government is unlikely to offend
the Fifth Amendment under Koontz.167
Apart from how state statutes direct or authorize in-lieu fee collection,
local governments would do well by supporting fee conditions with “nexus
studies” specific to the resource or facility that the conditions address.168
Not surprisingly in light of its extraordinary “reasonably foreseeable” requirement, California counties and municipalities provide the greatest number of examples of these types of studies.
The Merced Nexus Study, which focuses on the need for a pedestrian
pathway connecting new residential development to area schools near the
town of Snelling, California, states that the purpose of the study is “to determine the nexus (or reasonable relationship) between new development . . .
and the need for the off-site walking route as a result of this new development.”169 The report first analyzes the nexus, then “calculates cost allocation for each land use, based on the proportionate share of the total facility
use for each type of development.”170 The report sets out a series of findings, in line with California state law,171 that the county must make before
adopting the proposed fee:
[1] Identify the purpose of the fee.
[2] Identify how the fee is to be used.
[3] Determine how a reasonable relationship exists between the fee’s use and
the type of development project on which the fee is imposed.
[4] Determine how a reasonable relationship exists between the need for the
public facility and the type of development project on which the fee is
imposed.

167. At least one commentator suggests that Koontz’s most unfortunate effect will be a strain on the
necessary and often mutually-advantageous relationship between the local government planner assigned
to a given development project and the developer proposing that project. Julie A. Tappendorf & Matthew T. DiCianni, The Big Chill? – The Likely Impact of Koontz on the Local Government/Developer
Relationship, 30 Touro L. Rev. 455, 471–472 (2014).
168. See Am. Plan. Ass’n, Policy Guide on Impact Fees 2–3 (Apr. 1997) (available at http://
perma.cc/5JK7-QN6G (http://www.planning.org/policy/guides/pdf/impactfees.pdf)); Co. of Merced,
Cal., Nexus/Proportionality Study: Lakeview Estates Off-Site Walking Route 2 (Jan. 2011) (available at
http://perma.cc/57TC-A4RF (http://www.co.merced.ca.us/pdfs/env_docs/initial_studies/nexus_propor
tionality_study_020111.pdf)) [hereinafter Merced Nexus Study]; City of S.F. Plan. Dep’t, San Francisco
Eastern Neighborhoods Nexus Study I-7 to I-9 (May 2008) (available at http://perma.cc/BT9P-YKY4
(http://www.sf-planning.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=1467)) [hereinafter San Francisco Nexus Study].
169. Merced Nexus Study, supra n. 168, at 2.
170. Id.
171. See generally Cal. Gov. Code §§ 66000–66008 (Mitigation Fee Act).
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[5] Demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the amount of the fee and
the cost of the public facility attributable to the development on which the
fee is imposed.172

Similar to the Merced Nexus Study, the San Francisco Nexus Study,
commissioned as part of a multi-neighborhood rezoning and redevelopment
effort in the eastern portion of the city, “analyzes the relationship, or nexus,
between projected new development . . . resulting from the rezoning efforts
and the cost of providing public facilities to meet increased demand from
new residents and workers.”173 The study “calculates the cost or nexus
amount for libraries, transportation, recreation and parks, and child care,”
which the city can then apply to development proposals on a per-unit basis.174 The study outlines the following steps in calculating this per-unit
“nexus amount”:
Step 1 Estimate the existing household population, number of housing units
and number of jobs per land use category.
Step 2 Project future household population, number of housing units, number
of jobs, and other demand factors per land use category.
Step 3 Identify the portion of new residents and workers that will be served
by each category of improvement or facility for the relevant service
area.
Step 4 Determine facilities and/or improvements needed to serve the projected future population at the appropriate level.
Step 5 Estimate costs for facilities and the portion of these costs that is attributable to new development.
Step 6 Apportion these costs to residential and non-residential development
according to the projected impact of each type of land use.175

The procedures employed by the local governments in the above two
scenarios are ideal. The County of Merced and City of San Francisco commissioned the respective studies for the specific purpose of establishing the
necessary connections and justifications for imposing fees required by Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz. Coupled with adequate public process—hearings,
informational meetings, mailings, etc.—a local government would be wellpositioned to withstand both due process and takings challenges to fee programs.
VII. CONCLUSION
The effects of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Koontz are far
from understood at this early stage, but are likely to be complex and sweeping. The Koontz Court appears to have found a protectable property interest
172.
173.
174.
175.

Merced Nexus Study, supra n. 168, at 2.
San Francisco Nexus Study, supra n. 168, at I-1.
Id. at I-1, I-5–I-6.
Id. at I-8.
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in a landowner’s speculative use of his property. The Court neglected, however, to include in its rationale any substantive limitations on the extension
of heightened scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan into local government fee
impositions. In the long term, because local government’s best practice generally suggests justifying development conditions, the Koontz decision is
not likely to invalidate state statutory schemes or local regulations en
masse. However, the Koontz decision is likely to empower landowners and
developers to bring constitutional challenges against those schemes and regulations, and may bring local governments into state and federal courts to
defend land use takings claims with greater frequency than before the decision. This litigation pressure—additional burden on already-strained local
government resources—may be the most lasting and detrimental effect of
the decision.
Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court, state and federal courts, or state
and local governments may limit the reach of Koontz. Such limitations include but are not limited to: (1) applying heightened scrutiny under Nollan
and Dolan only under facts similar to Koontz; (2) applying heightened scrutiny to adjudicative fees as opposed to legislative fees; and, (3) statutorily
vesting a right to a stream of income from a proposed land use—and thus to
monetary exactions takings claim—at a specific point in the development
review process.
Park dedication as a condition of development approval is particularly
vulnerable under Koontz because local governments often either demand a
fee-in-lieu of real property or give the developer the option to pay the fee
when it comes to parkland. Some states, like California and Montana, have
existing statutory schemes that will likely put local governments in a good
position to withstand constitutional challenges to park-related monetary exactions. Others, like Washington, Wisconsin, and Maine, likely do not in
and of themselves provide enough guidance as to how local governments
can successfully structure and implement fee-in-lieu of park dedication regulations. Ultimately, states and local governments are best served by adopting programs and conducting studies that discourage particularized bargains
with landowners, while at the same time affording local government planners and permit applicants some degree of flexibility when choosing how to
provide the services that a jurisdiction deems necessary to health, safety,
and welfare.
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